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The fifth amendment states that "[n]o person . . .shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."' Literally,
these words confer the privilege on witnesses whose testimony implicates
them in the commission of a criminal act. Caselaw has demonstrated,
however, that implication in the commission of a criminal act is not
sufficient to trigger the privilege. Additionally, the witness' participa-
tion, if proven, must be punishable. As Justice Frankfurter stated, the
central concern of the privilege against self-incrimination is, "as its
name indicates, . . . the danger to a witness forced to give testimony
leading to the infliction of penalties affixed to the criminal act."' 2 Thus,
where a statute of limitations has run,3 or the witness has already in-
curred liability by previous testimony,4 the fifth amendment affords no/
right of silence. Absent such absolute bars to liability, the Supreme
Court has held in Homan v. United States5 that a mere possibility of in-
crimination is sufficient to invoke the privilege.
6
I U.S. CONST. amend. V. The availability of the privilege has been extended to grand
jury witnesses and to parties in civil proceedings, whether the forum is judicial, administra-
tive, or legislative. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972); Empsak v. United
States, 349 U.S. 190, 199-201 (1955); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924); Coun-
selman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 563-64 (1892). The Supreme Court held the fifth amend-
ment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 3 (1964).
2 Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438-39 (1956).
3 See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598 (1896); United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d
256, 259 (4th Cir. 1961).
4 See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1951) ("After petitioner's admission
that she held the office of Treasurer of the Communist Party of Denver, disclosure of acquain-
tance with her successor presents no more than a 'mere imaginary possibility' of increasing
the danger of prosecution.") (citations omitted). Although the Court invoked the term "dan-
ger of prosecution," it made no pretense of examining prosecution likelihoods; rather, its con-
cern focused on the criminating character of the evidence. See id at 374. Rogers also invoked
another rationale to support waiver: "[t]o uphold a claim of privilege in this case would open
the way to distortion of facts by permitting a witness to select any stopping place in the
testimony." Id at 371. See Note, Testimonial Waiver of the Privilege Against Se/f-Incrimination, 92
HARv. L. REv. 1752 (1979).
5 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
6 Id at 486-87, 488. See notes 25-32 & accompanying text infra.
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Following HoiRnan, courts have determined the merits of a fifth
amendment claim on the basis of two considerations: first, whether the
witness' response might indicate his participation in criminal activities,
and second, if these answers tend to indicate such participation, whether
they could expose the witness to the possibility of prosecution. 7 Focus-
ing on the possibility of prosecution, the federal judiciary, with one no-
table exception, has refused to consider the likelihood of prosecution as
material to a privilege determination. 8
This comment explores the validity of judicial unwillingness to ex-
amine prosecution likelihoods. The question addressed is whether, ab-
sent an immunity grant, a witness should be entitled to the privilege if
the court determines that the possibility of prosecution is remote. The
question is first examined from the perspective of the caselaw. In refus-
ing to consider prosecution likelihoods, courts have drawn authority
from Hofman. This reliance on Hoffman is problematic. Courts have
failed to address the distinction between the likelihood of testimony evi-
dencing a criminal violation and the likelihood that the government
would choose to prosecute if testimony did indicate a violation. 9 The
7 In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 620 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1980); In re
Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979); In re Brogna, 589 F.2d 24
(lst Cir. 1978); In re Master Key Litigation, 507 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206 (Ist Cir. 1973); United States v. Seavers, 472 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1961) (dictum); United States v. Miranti,
253 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1958). -
8 In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 465 F. Supp. 618, 621 (N.D. Ill. 1979), rev'd
per curiam, 609 F.2d 867. See notes 48-60 & accompanying text infia.
9 The court In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 620 F.2d at 1093, articu-
lated in the context of correcting the district court's use of the term "incriminatory:"
[The district court] suggested that the deposition testimony would not be "incrimina-
tory" since it would be "tainted." The existence of immunity or of derivative "taint"
would have no bearing on the question whether testimony would be "incriminatory,"
however. Incriminatory testimony is simply testimony that suggests that the witness may
have committed a crime. When incriminatory testimony is offered under a grant of im-
munity, the testimony remains incriminatory despite the immunity.
A series of decisions from the Second Circuit during the 19 40s seemed to indicate judicial
willingness to evaluate prosecution likelihoods. See United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837
(2d Cir. 1942) (Hand, J.); United States v. Cusson, 132 F.2d 413 (2d Cir. 1942) (Hand, J.);
United States v. St. Pierre, 128 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1942); United States v. Weisman, 111 F.2d
260 (2d Cir. 1940) (Hand, J.). The ambiguity of these decisions lay in their failure to distin-
guish the incrimination and prosecution questions.
In Weisman, the defendant was called before a grand jury investigating narcotics traffic
from Shanghai. He refused to answer two questions: first, whether he received any cables at
a restaurant in New York, and second, whether he knew anyone who had been in Shanghai
during specified years. An article had appeared in a New York newspaper indicating the
prosecutor's intention to indict for narcotics violations an advertising agency owner who had
had previous underworld connections. The defendant fit the description. The court noted
that the defendant was the object of more than casual interest on the part of the prosecutor,
who presumably had additional evidence in his possession. In reversing the contempt order,
Judge Hand stated, "Indeed, perhaps in the end we should say no more than that the chase
must not get too hot; or the scent, too fresh." 111 F.2d at 263. Although the danger of
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Hoffman Court's decision that testimony tending to indicate a possibility
of liability triggers the privilege was rendered against a factual backdrop
of a likely prosecution. The Court did not determine the status of the
privilege where prosecution was unlikely. Appellate courts nevertheless
have erroneously inferred from Hoffinan that any possibility of prosecu-
tion is sufficient to trigger the privilege.' 0
In an attempt to bridge this lapse in reasoning, the issue is next
examined from a policy and historical perspective. Over the centuries a
plethora of rationales have been offered for the privilege. Courts and
commentators have focused on three as paradigmatic: privacy, the dig-
nity of the individual, and the balance between the individual and
state."1 Analysis of the constitutional status of the test may vary de-
pending upon which of these three policies prevails. Rather than argu-
ing the relative merits of these rationales, this comment focuses on the
last in light of current Supreme Court emphasis.' 2 The Court's con-
struction of the balance between state and individual interests is not
inconsistent with considering the likelihood of prosecution as relevant to
the strength of a fifth amendment claim.
Critical to this conclusion, however, is the Court's instrumentalist
interpretation of this rationale-approximating the utilitarian approach
of Jeremy Bentham-which, as Professor O'Brien has pointed out, per-
mits the Court to define outcome determinative terms according to its
prevailing mood.' 3 A better approach, supported by the amendment's
history and the Hobbesian and Lockean traditions, is to view the privi-
lege as protecting the inviolate right to self-preservation of the Anglo-
American concept of government. 14 If the balance between state and
individual interests is analyzed according to the latter approach, then
the privilege is guaranteed by satisfying the Hoffinan standard irrespec-
tive of the likelihood of prosecution.
prosecution figures prominently in the holding, its relevance appears limited to permitting
inference of the availability of additional evidence to the prosecutor. Such an inference
would thus bear ultimately on the criminating quality of the answers sought. See Falknor,
Se/fCrrimination Privilege: "Links in the Chain," 5 VAND. L. REV. 479, 480-81, 481 n.8 (1952).
Federal court reliance on Hojinan is treated at notes 34-71 & accompanying text infra.
10 See notes 83-96 & accompanying text infra.
1 See notes 112-46 & accompanying text infra.
12 See notes 120-36 & accompanying text infra.
13 O'Brien, The F0t2h Amendment: Fox Hunters, Old Women, Hermits and the Burger Court, 54
NOTRE DAME LAw. 26, 54-72 (1978). See notes 120-22 & accompanying text infla. On Ben-
tham's approach, see notes 115-16 infra.
14 See notes 137-41 & accompanying text infra.
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HOFFMAN V UNITED STATES
In Unzted States v. Burr,'5 Justice Marshall enunciated the first state-
ment of the procedure for determining when a witness may invoke the
privilege. The court's province is to determine in the first instance
whether a witness' answer to a question will furnish evidence against
him. If the judge concludes that the answer would disclose a fact which
would form "a necessary and essential link in the chain of testimony
. . .sufficient to convict him of any crime,"'16 the witness need not re-
spond. The task of subsequent courts has been to refine the Burr stan-
dard for deciding whether a question is incriminatory, and,
correspondingly, to determine the scope of a trial court's discretion to
demand reasons from the claimant for invoking the privilege.
The leading case prior to Hoffinan was Mason v. United States 1
7
which, in light of subsequent caselaw, used a comparatively rigid ap-
proach to the application of the privilege. The statute involved in that
case criminalized participation in a card game played for money.' 8 De-
fendants Mason and Hanson were arrested at a billiard hall on charges
of violating the statute. At a grand jury hearing, they refused to answer
whether there had been a card game at their own or at another table,
and the district court held them in contempt. Affirming the district
court, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he constitutional protection
against self-incrimination 'is confined to real dangers and does not ex-
tend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course of law.' "19 The
Court concluded that the trial judge is in a better position to evaluate
the critical facts than the reviewing court, "and he must be permitted to
exercise some discretion, fructified by common sense, when dealing with
this necessarily difficult subject."
'20
Although the Hoffnan Court cited Mason to support its decision,
21
an appellate court judge, doubting Mason-s vitality, stated soon after
Hofnan that Mason would no longer be followed. 22 Courts and scholars
since have likewise considered Mason dead.23 Although this conclusion
is dubious, 24 Hofinan invoked a significantly more liberal rule than Ma-
15 25 F. Cas. 38 (D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692e).
16 Id at 40.
17 244 U.S. 362 (1917).
18 Id at 367 (citing COMp. LAWS ALAsKA § 2032 (1913)).
19 Id at 365.
20 Id at 366.
21 341 U.S. at 486.
22 United States v. Coffey, 198 F.2d 438, 440 (3d Cir. 1952).
23 See, e.g., In re Brogna, 589 F.2d at 27 (discussed in note 64 infra); M. BERGER, TAKING
THE FiFr 87-88 (1980).
24 See notes 83-111 & accompanying text infra.
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son as to what was incriminating and sharply reduced the discretion
accorded to the trial judge.
Hoffman involved a federal grand jury investigation into racketeer-
ing and other federal crimes in the Eastern District of Pennsyl-.a,"'.
Summoned as a witness, Hoffman was held in criminal contempt after
refusing to answer questions pertaining to his business and his knowl-
edge of the whereabouts of one Weisberg. In overruling the Third Cir-
cuit's affirmance 25 of the contempt order, the Hoftman Court noted that
Weisberg was one of eight subpoenaed witnesses who did not appear.
The prosecutor had acknowledged that he was having trouble locating
some major racketeers, presumably including Weisberg, whom Hoffman
had admitted knowing for twenty years. The Court further noted Hoff-
man's long criminal record, which had been brought to the attention of
the judge.
The Court held Hoffman was entitled to plead the fifth amend-
ment to both sets of questions. In connection with the business ques-
tions, the Court noted that the chief occupation of some persons
involved evasion of federal criminal laws, and that his response might
have revealed Hoffman's involvement in proscribed activity. As to the
Weisberg questions, the Court observed that an individual with a police
record testifying at a grand jury investigation of racketeering might be
hiding or helping to hide another person sought as a witness. The Court
stated that the questions could have "forge[d] links in a chain of facts"
sufficient for a conviction although they were not held incriminating per
se.26 The Court concluded with language that has apparently inspired
appellate courts considering the likelihood of prosecution issue. "In this
setting it was not 'perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the
circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the an-
swer[s] cannot possibly have such a tendency' to incriminate.
'27
After two more reversals following Hoffraan,28 a somewhat disgrun-
25 United States v. Hoffman, 185 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1950).
26 341 U.S. at 488.
27 Id. (quoting Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 898 (1881) (emphasis in original)).
"[The now prevailing general judicial attitude [is] that almost any conceivable danger is 'real
and appreciable.'" C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 123 (2d ed. 1972). Se, e.g., Wehling v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1087 n.5 (5th Cir. 1979) (The privilege may be
invoked where the witness "reasonably apprehends a risk of self-incrimination. . . though no
criminal charges are pending against him. . . and even if the risk of prosecution is remote.").
28 United States v. Singleton, 343 U.S. 944 (1952); United States v. Greenberg, 343 U.S.
918 (1952). Greenberg clarified the breadth of the Hoftan rule. The witness responded affirm-
atively to the questions whether he knew any number of writers in Philadelphia, but declined
to respond when asked their identity. The circuit court held the questions not incriminatory.
187 F.2d 35, 40 (3d Cir. 1951). On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case for consid-
eration in light of the then recent Hofman decision. 341 U.S. 944 (1951). In reaching the
same conclusion on remand, the Third Circuit distinguished Hoffman as raising a strong pre-
1981]
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tied Third Circuit in Unied States v. Coffq 2 9 articulated its understand-
ing of the Hoffman rule. First, the defense must show how a seemingly
harmless answer could be linked to the commission of a federal crime.
The necessary showing is that the suggested linkage must not seem in-
credible in the circumstances. In determining the credibility of the
linkage, the judge is free to consider the history and reputation of the
witness. Most important was the court's statement of the spirit in which
the rule was to be interpreted. "[I]n determining whether the witness
really apprehends danger in answering a question, the judge cannot per-
mit himself to be skeptical; rather must he be acutely aware that . . .
incrimination may be approached and achieved by obscure and unlikely
lines of inquiry."30 The Supreme Court subsequently approved the Cof-
fe> formulation in Empsak v. United States which result seemed to Jus-
tice Harlan "to verge on an abandonment of the rule that a valid claim
of privilege exists only as to incriminatory questions.
'32
POST-HOFFMAN AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF PROSECUTION TEST
Hofman has provided the touchstone for the categoric rejection of
the likelihood of prosecution test by the federal courts of appeals. 33 The
sumption of violation of federal narcotics laws, whereas the numbers racket involved in Green-
berg was an activity proscribed by state law to which constitutional immunity did not extend.
192 F.2d at 203. The circuit court dismissed Greenberg's argument that disclosure of his
business would lead to questions about his income from that business which in turn might
incriminate him in criminal violations of the Internal Revenue laws. The Supreme Court
summarily reversed on the authority of Hofraan. 343 U.S. 918.
29 198 F.2d 438 (3d Cir. 1952).
30 Id at 440-41.
31 349 U.S. 190, 198 n.18 (1955). The Supreme Court quoted the Cofey formulation with
approval again in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. at 13 n.9.
32 349 U.S. at 204 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Empsak was General Secretary Treasurer of
the United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America as well as editor of the Union's
official publication. He appeared before the House Committee on Un-American Activities
where he refused to answer a series of questions relating to his associates and their position in
the union. In holding the questions to be within the scope of the privilege, the Court noted
that each of the named individuals had been charged previously with having communist
affiliations, that Empsak had been named as a communist at the trial of eleven principal
leaders of the Party who were subsequently convicted under the Smith Act, and that newspa-
pers reported that the Department of Justice would soon take " 'an important step' toward
the criminal prosecution of petitioner." Id at 200.
Justice Harlan premised his dissent on the principle that "if background facts can make
an innocent question dangerous, they can also make a dangerous question innocent." Id at
208. He then argued that in light of Empsak's position in the union, "it is difficult to see how
the fact that Empsak knew some of these people or what position each held in the Union can
rationally be said to support even an inference that he knew of their alleged communist affili-
ations, much less tend to prove that he himself had taken part in communist" activities. Id at
210.
33 See note 7 supra.
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first case to deal with the issue was United States v. Mirant, 34 a Second
Circuit decision which rejected the test outright. Miranti and five
others were indicted for conspiring to obstruct justice. The government
later decided not to prosecute Miranti and a codefendant, Bando, for
obstruction of justice. Based on their detailed statements, the prosecu-
tion instead obtained convictions for conspiracy to remove a fugitive
felon from New York state. After refusing to testify for the government
at the trial of the other alleged conspirators, they were summoned to
testify before a grand jury investigating related crimes. There they re-
fused to testify on fifth amendment grounds and were cited for con-
tempt.3
5
Although Miranti and Bando were still subject to liability for the
substantive crimes, 36 the government argued that, once they had been
put in jeopardy for conspiracy, they could not reasonably fear prosecu-
tion for the substantive offenses themselves. The court was thus "faced
with the novel question whether or not a witness can invoke his privilege
against self-incrimination where practically there is only a slight possi-
bility of prosecution. '37 Reversing the contempt order, the court found
"no justification for limiting the historic protection of the Fifth Amend-
ment by creating an exception to the general rule which would nullify
the privilege whenever it appears that the government would not under-
take to prosecute. ' 38 Citing Homan and Empsak, the court declared the
decision to be "in accord with recent Supreme Court decisions liberally
construing the protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment.1 39 Mason
34 253 F.2d 135.
35 The government asked Miranti and Bando to acknowledge previous admissions which
had served as a basis for their convictions. Id at 136.
36 They were potentially liable under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1948) (obstructing justice) and
under 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1948) (aiding a fugitive felon escape across state lines).
37 253 F.2d at 139.
38 Id (footnote omitted).
39 Id at 139 n.3. The court also cited Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957); Gru-
newald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957); and Trock v. United States, 351 U.S. 976
(1956). In Track, the defendant, convicted for contempt, had refused to answer questions
before a grand jury relating to certain named individuals and his business connections with
certain named entities. Two questions, later withdrawn, inquired whether the defendant had
used the name of either an indicted individual who had not yet been apprehended, or the
name of one thought to be his accomplice. 232 F.2d at 840. Citing Hqiran, the Court sum-
marily reversed the Second Circuit's holding that the questions would have no direct ten-
dency to link the witness with any criminal activity. 351 U.S. at 976.
In Curcio, the Court upheld the refusal of a Teamsters local officer to answer questions
about union books which he had failed to produce in response to a subpoena ad tesiftandum.
The grand jury was investigating racketeering in New York City. The Court first determined
that the custodian of books may not refuse to produce them on fifth amendment grounds, but
that he may refuse to answer incriminating questions pertaining to them in the absence of an
immunity grant. The second issue, whether the questions were incriminating, was mooted by
the government's concession that they were. Nevertheless, noting that the purpose of the
1981]
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was distinguished as a case dealing "with questions ... clearly not in-
criminatory." 40 The court supported its rejection of the likelihood .of
prosecution test with the further argument that assessing the practical
possibility of prosecution resulting from incriminating answers is "im-
possible. . . because it depends on the discretion exercised by a United
States Attorney or his successor."
4 1
Facially, this argument is untenable because it presumes that a
prosecutor's decision to prosecute is completely arbitrary. In most cases,
this decision is rationally correlated to a set of relevant factors. 42 Appar-
ently the Miranti court was simply voicing its fears about the margin of
error necessarily associated with any given prediction. As long as there
was some possibility of prosecution, the court would allow the witness to
invoke the privilege for incriminating statements. Compelled testimony
investigation was the domination of the local union by racketeers, and the petitioner's previ-
ous record, the Court concluded there was "substantial ground for the Government's conces-
sion." 354 U.S. at 121.
Unlike the other four cases, Grunewald did not present a Hofnan issue. The case involved
an alleged conspiracy to defraud the United States by fixing tax fraud cases. Grunewald stands
for the proposition that where a witness' plea of the fifth amendment before a grand jury is
consistent with his trial testimony, the government may not use the plea for impeachment.
353 U.S. at 419. The Second Circuit's citation may question the extent to which it was rely-
ing on the Hoffian principle rather than the spirit of the Supreme Court's fifth amendment
construction.
40 253 F.2d at 139 n.2. But see note 98 & accompanying text infta. Under Hojiman these
questions assuredly would have been held incriminating. The court also distinguished Brown
v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, as dealing with the constitutionality of an immunity statute and its
effect on state prosecutions for crimes based on disclosure before a federal grand jury. See
notes 91-92 & accompanying text infla. The Miranti court stated that both cases are "totally
inapposite on their facts and do not deal with situations where lack of fear of incrimination is
based on the improbability of prosecution." 253 F.2d at 139.
41 Id. See United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d at 260. The Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Chase, 281 F.2d 225, 229-30 (7th Cir. 1960), invoked the Miranli analysis in a virtu-
ally identical factual setting.
42 These factors may include the political posture of the prosecutor, the type and age of
the case, the cost of proceeding, the existence of alternative remedies, the potential for deter-
rence, the age, background, and record of the defendant, the chance of success and public
opinion. See generaly F. INBAU, J. THOMPSON, J. HADDAD, J. ZAGEL and G. STARKMAN,
CASES AND COMMENTARIES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 582-91 (2d ed. 1980). Even critics of
the disparate treatment of defendants flowing from discretionary decisions to prosecute have
recognized that those criteria allow for predictability in individual cases. K. DAVIs, DISCRE-
TIONARY JUSTICE 9-10 (1971).
Whether to prosecute or to refrain from prosecuting X may involve questions ofjustice,
law, facts, policy, politics, and ethics. One question ofjustice may be whether prosecut-
ing X is unfair where the known offenses of other parties who are not prosecuted are
greater. A question of law may be a new one or the subject of conflicting decisions. The
factual picture may be incomplete and agency members may have to fill it in through
intelligent guesswork. A policy question which may divide agency members is whether
the agency's resources may better be devoted to another area. A problem of politics may
be appraisal of the capacity of X's supporters to retaliate. And a problem of ethics may
be whether pressures applied on X's behalf are beyond the pale.
Id at 24-25.
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would be permitted only in the event that the then existing scope of
immunity was broadened "in order to allow the prosecutor to bind the
government not to prosecute and thereby protect the witness' rights in
such situations."
43
The Second Circuit thus viewed the likelihood of prosecution as an
extraneous inquiry into the probable danger to witnesses resulting from
a given line of questioning. For constitutional purposes, the probability
question was answerable with the Hoinan inquiry into the incrimina-
tory character of the evidence. Any lessening in the danger to the wit-
ness that might flow from considerations of prosecution possibilities was,
according to the Miranti court, immaterial when posited in the context
of the historic protections liberally construed by the Supreme Court.
44
The Miranti court merely restated the problem in viscerally appeal-
.ing language characteristic of cases responding to the McCarthy era.
45
43 253 F.2d at 139. The operative statute, the Immunity Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 4, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3486, was repealed in 1970. Its replacement, the Witness Immunity Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 6001-6005 (1976), no longer restricts immunity grants according to the type of case. Sec-
tion 6002 states:
Immunity generally.
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination,
to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a committee
or a subcommittee of either House, and the person presiding over the proceeding com-
municates to the witness an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to
comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no
testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly
or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the
witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or
otherwise failing to comply with the other.
Under the statute, the United States Attorney has exclusive power to initiate immunity
grants. 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b). Courts are thus precluded from granting immunity on their
own or on the witness' motion. Thompson v. Garrison, 516 F.2d 986, 988 (4th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 933 (1976); United States v. Allstate Mortgage Corp., 507 F.2d 492, 495 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975). Apparently, the federal prosecutor can confer
immunity in civil proceedings only where the government is a party. See United Stateg v.
United States Currency, No. 78-1162 (6th Cir. July 14, 1980); Appeal of Starkey, 600 F.2d
1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 1979); In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 479 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977).
The cases have made clear that the statute extends only to use and derivative use of
compelled testimony. It does not confer so-called transactional immunity, which would bar
prosecution of a witness for crimes revealed in his testimony. Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441. After granting immunity, however, the government must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that its evidence was derived from legitimate sources. Id at 460-61.
Courts have scrupulously guarded against impermissible use of immunized testimony. See,
e.g., United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 517 (2d Cir. 1976).
44 253 F.2d at 139 n.3.
45 Dean Erwin Griswold's book, E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFrH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955),
provided a well of emotionally charged language invoked by countless courts and scholars
during the 1950s and early 1960s. See, e.g., id at 7, quoted in Ullmann v. United States, 350
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The lack of certainty in estimating prosecution likelihoods is precisely
what puts the constitutionality of such predictions at issue.46 Although
the materiality of prosecution likelihood to fifth amendment claims has
been examined in a variety of contexts, 47 no court has carried the rejec-
tion of the test beyond assertion.
The only attack against the position of the Second Circuit recently
came from the Northern District of Illinois in In re Folding Carton Antitrust
Liigation.48 Nine defendants in a civil antitrust action by the Depart-
U.S. at 426 (the privilege is "one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself
civilized"); E. GRISWOLD, supra, at 73, quoted in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. at 9 n.7 (The fifth
amendment is "an expression of the moral striving of the community. . . . a reflection of our
common conscience, a symbol of America which stirs our hearts."). Judge Friendly writes'
that
[i]n the mid-1950's it was necessary to vindicate the privilege against self-incrimination
. . . against the opprobrium that Senator Joseph McCarthy and others sought to heap
on many who properly invoked it, particularly before legislative committees, and Dean
Griswold earned the nation's gratitude by speaking out as he did. At the end of the
1960's it is necessary to vindicate the rights of society against what in my view has be-
come a kind of obsession which has stretched the privilege beyond not only its language
and history but any justification in policy, and threatens to go further still.
Friendly, The Ffth Amendment Tomorrow: The Casefor Constitutional Change, 37 U. GIN. L. REV.
671, 671-72 (1968). See also Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 216, 217,
220, 223 (1968) (Griswold seems to concur in Friendly's characterization of his earlier work.).
46 Drawing on the language of the amendment, the argument can be made that there is
no issue because the language prohibits forcing a witness to testify against himself, therefore
likelihoods of prosecution are irrelevant. To avoid inconsistency, however, a literalist would
have to take account of the criminal case limitation. Of course, likelihoods of prosecution are
irrelevant where a defendant is called to testify in his own criminal trial, and the language
reflects this obvious fact in failing to refer to prosecution likelihoods. The linguistic argument
loses force when beyond the literal comprehension of the words, the fifth amendment extends
to civil contexts, for example. On the other hand, the elements of compulsion and possibility
of punishment common to both situations might militate against disparate treatment arising
from considerations of prosecution likelihoods and in favor of preserving the integrity of the
language to the extent that it does not contemplate prosecution likelihoods. Moreover, the
criminal case limitation might be read literally to include nonparty witnesses in a criminal
case within the parameters of the fifth amendment coverage. The question becomes why a
civil witness should be treated differently. But a strict reading of the criminal case limitation
may also lead to the conclusion that the violation does not occur until the compelled testi-
mony is introduced into the testificant's own criminal trial. Cf M. BERGER, supra note 23, at
49 ("[T]here is nothing inherently wrong with the process of compulsory incriminatory inter-
rogations; instead there is merely a need to confine it so that such questioning would not
emerge in the subject's own criminal trial."). Under this interpretation, prosecution likeli-
hoods would be highly relevant. A possible problem with this reading is that the compulsion
occurs prior to the introduction of the evidence in the criminal proceedings, and the cases
preclude compulsion only at the earlier point. The potential temporal conflict between
"compelled" and "in any criminal case" that arises concomitantly with extension of fifth
amendment protections to noncriminal proceedings, although for the most part resolved as a
matter of policy in favor of the time of questioning, see note 1 supra, highlights that the lan-
guage of the amendment cannot resolve the issue. Cf Friendly, supra note 45, at 677 ("once
'in any criminal case' has been read out of the amendment, it has been all too tempting to
take equal liberties with 'shall be compelled' and 'to be a witness against himself.' ").
47 See note 64 inqfra.
48 465 F. Supp. 618. For an excellent recent discussion of the Folding Carton case, see
SELF-INCRIMINA TION
ment of Justice claimed the privilege in response to questions at deposi-
tions. The civil action followed the Justice Department's successful
prosecution of a number of other individuals and corporations for crimi-
nal violations of the Sherman Act.
49
Viewing the prosecution of these witnesses as only a "remote and
speculative" possibility,50 the district court premised its lengthy opinion
compelling deposition testimony on the proposition that a witness may
plead the fifth amendment only if there exists a "real danger" in re-
sponding to the questions.5' A necessary condition to real danger, ac-
cording to the district court opinion, is a "reasonable fear of
prosecution. '5 2 The district court set out three steps to determine
whether the witness has a reasonable fear of prosecution. 53 First, a court
must determine whether the witness' answers to the questions would
tend to indicate his participation in criminal activities. Second, it must
decide whether prosecution is theoretically possible. For example,
where a statute of limitations bars prosecution, the witness will not be
entitled to plead the fifth'amendment. Finally, if the court answers the
first two inquiries in the affirmative, it must decide whether the threat of
prosecution is merely a remote and speculative possibility.
Although the witness theoretically remained open to possible prose-
cution, the opinion emphasized that the Department of Justice's com-
pleted investigation of the Folding Carton criminal conspiracy was the
most exhaustive in the history of the antitrust laws, involving the largest
number of defendants in any case tried to a conclusion, and that federal
authorities showed no interest in producing new indictments.54 As to
the minority of states with unexpired statutes of limitations, the court
found the likelihood of their having "at this late date. . . the resources,
time and interest to initiate an investigation and prosecution. . . to be
'trifling' at best."'55 Moreover, five of the witnesses had been granted
immunity in return for testimony before the federal grand jury that re-
turned the original indictments. An additional factor making prosecu-
Comment, A Peek into Pandora's Box: Folding Carton and the Privilege Against Sel]-Incrimination in
Civil Antitrust Action, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 435 (1980). See also Morrison, Commentay:
Availability of Fifth Amendment Pnvilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Pennissibility of Drawing
Adverse Inferences: Alternative Perspectives, 48 ANTrrRUST LJ. 1421, 1424 (1979) (Hojnan pro-
vides appropriate test).
49 United States v. Consol. Packaging Corp., 575 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1978).
50 In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 465 F. Supp. at 622.
51 Id at 621 (citing Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472, 480
(1972)). See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. at 374-75. See also notes 83-111 & accompany-
ing text infra for a discussion of the real danger doctrine.
52 465 F. Supp. at 621.
53 Id
54 Id at 622. See also United States v. Consol. Packaging Corp., 575 F.2d at 119 n.1.
55 465 F. Supp. at 622.
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tion of the defendants unlikely was the heavy burden of proving an
untainted prosecution.
56
The court recognized the difficulty of predicting prosecution likeli-
hoods and the historical unwillingness of courts to override the privilege
where there exists only a minimal possibility of prosecution.5 7 The dis-
trict court, however, opined that cases such as Miranti, which reject the
test outright, have "erroneously reconciled the recognized power of both
the state and federal governments 'to compel residents to testify in court
or before grand juries or agencies'. . . with the fifth amendment privi-
leges of the witnesses."'58 The court expressed concern that sustaining
the privilege on the grounds that prosecution is theoretically possible
"would signal a virtual end to discovery in civil cases," 59 and empha-
sized that in the event of subsequent prosecution the government would
not be entitled to use the compelled testimony.
60
56 Id at 623. See note 43 supra.
57 465 F. Supp. at 624. The court conceded that, in cases of limited geographical scope,
securing binding commitments from the prosecutor would be a preferable mode of procedure.
See In re Arizona Dairy Prod. Litigation, Civ. No. 74-569 (D. Ariz. November 23, 1977). See
also Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges.- A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discre-
tion, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 246 (1980) (study of the Northern District of Illinois). The court
stated, however, that such a procedure would be impractical in the case of a nationwide
conspiracy. On the other hand, given the predictability of prosecution, such a procedural
safeguard probably becomes less necessary as the geographical scope of the case decreases.
Although application of prosecutional discretion may be predictable within a given jurisdic-
tion, prosecutorial policies and constraints may vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
See Mellon, Jacoby & Brewer, The Prosecutor Constrained by his Environment: A New Look at Discre-
tionagyJastice in the UnitedStates, 72 J. CRIM. L. & C. 52 (1981). The authors compare fourteen
state prosecutorial offices across the country and conclude that each operates according to one
of several policy types.
58 465 F. Supp. at 623.
59 Id at 625.
60 Id See Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 181 (1954). The court quoted from Kastigar
v. United States, 406 U.S. at 457 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964) ("a . . . witness may not be compelled to give testimony
which may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits
cannot be used in any manner by . . . officials in connection with a criminal prosecution
against him.")). Federal statutes, however, confer the power to grant immunity exclusively
on the executive. 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b). See note 43 supra. Arguably, by compelling testimony,
the district court effectively granted immunity, thereby trespassing upon statutorily pre-
scribed executive authority. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 620 F.2d 1086.
But see Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., No. 79-1994 (8th Cir. June 10, 1980); Appeal
of Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043. On the other hand, this argument presupposes that a fifth amend-
ment right of silence has attached at the time of compelling testimony. If no constitutional
right of silence exists, nothing precludes judicial compulsion of testimony to secure judicial
proceedings from abuse. United States v. United Fruit, 410 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 820 (1969). Thus, whether a judge, who finds prosecution a remote and speculative
possibility, confers an unlawful grant of immunity by compelling a witness to testify is an-
swerable only after determining whether the likelihood of prosecution is of constitutional im-
port. The district court in Folding Carton seemed to say as much:
Granting the motions to compel does not, however, constitute an immunity grant. This
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Recognizing the potential obstruction to civil discovery, the Sev-
enth Circuit was nevertheless unwilling to make the privilege dependent
on a judge's prediction of the likelihood of prosecution.6 I The court
thus rejected the third step of the district court's inquiry and held that
"[w]hen a witness can demonstrate any possibility of prosecution which
is more than fanciful he has demonstrated a reasonable fear of prosecu-
tion sufficient to meet constitutional muster. ' 62 Stating flatly that the
fancifulness criterion is met only where there is an absolute bar to prose-
cution, the court explicitly aligned itself with Miranti63 and indicated its
readiness to grant the privilege upon a Hofian showing 6 4 Contrary to
Court's decision is exclusively premised on a judicial determination that, as a practical
matter, there is solely a theoretical and no actual possibility that these witnesses could be
prosecuted for any activities with respect to which they might testify. Our decision is in
no way based on an evaluation of the advisability, fairness, or wisdom of any prosecution
465 F. Supp. at 625.
61 In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 609 F.2d at 872. This case was the appeal of
R. Harper Brown, whom the district court had compelled to testify in a separate opinion
adopting the reasons previously set forth in the district court opinion discussed above. Brown,
defendant in a civil action for damages brought by the Department of Justice for alleged
violation of the false claims and antitrust laws (United States v. Alton Box Bd. Co., No. 76-C-
1638 (N.D. Ill. 1976)), refused on fifth amendment grounds to respond to questions at civil
deposition after stating his name and address. The district court granted a motion to compel
testimony, but in the subsequent deposition Brown again, after providing additional informa-
tion about his educational background, refused to answer questions. Holding that Brown did
not have sufficient fear of prosecution to justify his assertion of the privilege, the district court
held him in contempt. Brown, president of Container Corporation of America, had already
been named along with 49 other executives and 23 folding carton producers in an indictment
charging a one-count misdemeanor violation for conspiring to fix prices between 1964 and
1970. United States v. Consol. Packaging Corp., 575 F.2d 117. Brown had pleaded nolo
contendere, and the district court imposed a sentence of 15 days incarceration, a $15,000 fine,
and a mandatory probation project. Brown remained open to state and federal charges aris-
ing both from the same facts as his earlier indictment if an additional element were needed to
prove these charges, and from activities occurring after 1974. 609 F.2d at 869-70, 871.
6 2 Id at 871.
63 Id at 872.
64 Id The Seventh Circuit did not cite Hojfman for this proposition, but Miranti and sub-
sequent caselaw leading to Folding Carton make clear that the rejection of the likelihood of
prosecution test draws its primary support from Hojinan. The First Circuit considered the
issue in United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206. In that case the defendant, charged with
distributing cocaine, sought testimony from a codefendant who had previously pleaded to the
same charge. Invoking the fifth amendment, the codefendant refused to testify. The First
Circuit relied on Miranli and upheld the assertion of the privilege on the grounds that the
codefendant was still subject to possible state and federal prosecutions for conspiracy. The
court first announced the Hojinan rule, and then in a footnote stated that "fn]either the prac-
tical unlikelihood of further prosecution, nor the Assistant United States Attorney's denial of
an intention to charge conspiracy, negated Perry's [the codefendant's] privilege." Id at 1209
n.2.
The First Circuit also considered the question of prosecution likelihoods in In re Brogna,
589 F.2d 24, where a witness at a grand jury investigation pleaded the fifth amendment to
questions about her connection with individuals allegedly involved in racefixing schemes.
Noting that the government's evidence showed leading underworld figures may have con-
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the district court, the Seventh Circuit held that exclusion of compelled
evidence is "solely remedial" and not justificatory of a "decision which
contravenes the fifth amendment's protection.
'65
The Seventh Circuit's decision was forcefully affirmed by the Fifth
Circuit in In re Corrugated Contatner Antitrust Litigation.66 Two executives,
previously granted use immunity in return for grand jury testimony to
alleged antitrust violations in the corrugated container industry, refused
to answer questions as nonparty witnesses at deposition in a subsequent
action brought by purchasers of corrugated products against the wit-
nesses' employers. Despite the trial court's findings that the deposition
questions were either taken verbatim from the transcripts of the immu-
ducted illegal business from her house, the court held on the authority of Hoffmnan that the
trial "court should have sustained her claim without more." Id at 27. Mason v. United
States was distinguished as an old case urging "an approach inconsistent with Hojfman and all
the cases that have followed it." Id Turning to the question of prosecution likelihood, the
court held the fact "unimportant . . . that Brogna was not a 'target' of the investigation."
Prosecutorial assurances could not bind the government, "at least in such a way as to provide
the encompassing immunity required to negate a claim of privilege." Id at 28. The court
quoted language from United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977), which stated that
"[W]itnesses who are not grand jury targets are protected from compulsory self-incrimination
to the same extent as those who are. . . .[T]arget witness status neither enlarges nor dimin-
ishes the constitutional protection against compelled self-incrimination . . . ." Id at 189.
United States v. Seavers, 472 F.2d 607, involved a defendant who, having pleaded guilty
to transporting a stolen automobile across state lines in violation of the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2312 (1948), asserted the privilege when called to testify as a witness at the trial of another
accused of aiding and abetting him. The court upheld the privilege with respect to questions
relating to the acquisition and possession of the vehicle because of the possibility of state
prosecution for the theft. Unwilling to assume that "dual prosecutions do not take place," the
court stated that the danger of prosecution was not "an imaginary or unsubstantial contin-
gency." 472 F.2d at 611. The court adopted the quoted language from United States v.
Harmon, 339 F.2d 354, 359 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965), which in turn
relied on Hofran.
The Ninth Circuit found the test unacceptable in In re Master Key Litigation, 507 F.2d
292, where the defendants, four manufacturers of contract hardware, allegedly conspired to
fix prices at inflated levels. Although neither state nor federal prosecutors appeared inter-
ested in bringing charges, the court observed that the witness, president of one of the defend-
ant manufacturers, did not receive an immunity grant or any assurances that he would not be
prosecuted. Drawing its authority directly from Hofman, the court concluded that "the right
to assert one's privilege against self-incrimination does not depend on the likelihood, but upon
the possibih'ty of prosecution." Id at 293 (emphasis in original).
See also Camelot Group, Ltd. v. V.A. Krueger Co., 486 F. Supp. 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Priebe v. World Ventures, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1976); United States v. Ward,
314 F. Supp. 261, 263-64 (E.D. La. 1970); In the Matter of Universal Lunches, Inc., 2 Bankr.
Rptr. 58 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
65 609 F.2d at 872 n.ll. But see note 60 supra. If prosecution likelihood is constitutionally
pertinent to fifth amendment determinations, a subsequent prosecution is theoretically con-
ceivable without the witness' fifth amendment right having been violated during the proceed-
ing at which testimony was compelled based upon a perceived improbability of prosecution.
Subsequent exclusion would not remedy a constitutional violation, but would rather protect
constitutional interests in the first instance.
66 620 F.2d 1086.
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nized testimony, or were so closely related in subject matter or so clearly
derived from the immunized testimony as to be thoroughly tainted,
67
the Fifth Circuit, relying on Hoffman,68 found that the witness had a
reasonable fear of prosecution and reversed the district court's order
compelling testimony.69 Noting the exclusionary rule that operates after
an erroneous privilege ruling to prevent introduction of that evidence
against the witness, 70 the Fifth Circuit stated that the district court had
effectively granted immunity "of its own accord," contrary to the provi-
sions of the immunity statute.
7'
Cormgated Container's diatribe against judicial overstepping in fifth
amendment cases culminates a twenty year line of appellate decisions
which have uniformly rejected the likelihood of prosecution test.7
2
There are three main reasons for federal court refusal to adopt a likeli-
hood of prosecution test. First, the judge may err in his prediction, and
if he does so err, any exclusionary rule operative in a subsequent pro-
ceeding would be remedial only of the prior constitutional violation. 73
Second, by compelling testimony because the chance of prosecution ap-
pears remote, a judge effectively grants immunity, and thereby usurps a
function statutorily conferred exclusively on the Justice Department.
74
Finally, it is argued that the purpose of the privilege is to protect the
witness from having to assist in his own prosecution. Despite exclusion,
the compelled testimony may stimulate new lines of inquiry leading to
67 In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, No. 80-1284 (S.D. Tex. March 6,
1980); id., No. 80-1307 (S.D. Tex. March 6, 1980); id, No. 80-1388 (S.D. Tex. March 19,
1980).
68 The court did not cite Hofman, but relied heavily on Folding Carton and Wehling v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, 608 F.2d 1084. Citing Hojinan and In re Master Key Litiga-
tion, 507 F.2d 292 (discussed in note 64 supra), the Wehing court stated that a witness may
invoke the privilege when "reasonably apprehend[ing] a risk of self-incrimination. . . though
no criminal charges are pending against him . . . and even if the risk of prosecution is re-
mote." 608 F.2d at 1087 n.5.
69 After determining that there was more than a fanciful risk of prosecution, the court
held that neither the immunity statute nor the court's inherent powers permitted it to make a
prospective determination that future testimony would be tainted. Accord, In re Folding Car-
ton Antitrust Litigation, 465 F. Supp. at 628 (the burden of disproving taint, however, bears
on the likelihood of prosecution). Contra, Appeal of Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043. Starky involved
a factual situation proximate to that in Corrugated Container. Holding that the witness would
not be subject to prosecution for testimony delivered at deposition because of taint, the court
explicitly reserved the question whether courts should assess the likelihood of prosecution. Id
at 1046. In light of the Eighth Circuit's willingness to permit a court to make a prospective
taint determination, however, an adoption of a likelihood of prosecution test would not be
surprising.
70 620 F.2d at 1094.
7' Id
72 See notes 7 & 64 supra.
73 See, e.g., In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 609 F.2d at 872 n.1 1; United States
v. Miranti, 253 F.2d at 139. See also notes 41-43 & accompanying text supra.
74 See notes 46 & 60 supra.
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prosecution and conviction. 75
The first two objections necessarily contain an assumption that the
likelihood of prosecution test is unconstitutional. As to the first, its rejec-
tion of the test on the grounds that prosecution may take place is circu-
lar. The label "remedial," used to characterize exclusion in an
unforeseen subsequent proceeding, likewise suggests that speculating
about future executive action is unconstitutional. But the so-called re-
medial nature of exclusion is determinable only after deciding that such
speculation is unconstitutional. Moreover, unlike the exclusionary rule
involved in the case of fourth amendment violations, 76 exclusion in fifth
amendment cases is self-executing becausp of its explicitly stated concern
with compelling a witness to testify against himself "in any criminal
case."
7 7
The second objection, that assessing prosecution likelihoods
amounts to a de facto judicial immunity grant in violation of the Immu-
nity Act, does not in any event displace a constitutional inquiry. A
judge is not granting immunity, but rather is simply ensuring the integ-
rity of the judicial process, if the witness is not entitled to the privilege in
the first instance. 78 The latter determination is precisely the function of
the court. 79 The constitutional materiality of prosecution likelihoods is
then analytically anterior to, rather than derived from, considerations of
statutory immunity.80
The third objection, despite its appeal, confuses the operation of the
privilege with its rationale.8 ' Consequent to pleading the privilege, the
witness may protect information known to him from falling into the
hands of the government. In some teleological sense, this result may be
75 See Comment, supra note 48, at 451.
76 See generally Sunderland, Liberals, Conservatives, and the Exclusionay Rule, 71 J. GRIM. L. &
C. 343 (1980).
77 U.S. CONST. amend. V. See note 46 supra.
78 See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 620 F.2d at 1095 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 465 F. Supp. at 625. See also note 60
supra.
79 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. at 487; United States v. Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d
1042, 1046 (5th Cir. 1976).
80 Of course this constitutional issue need not be reached if in a given case the court
premised its refusal to grant the privilege on the advisability, fairness, or wisdom of prosecu-
tion, rather than on absence of constitutional entitlement. Compelling testimony on these
grounds is solely within the sphere of executive authority. See In re Daley, 549 F.2d 467, 479
(7th Cir. 1977).
81 The statement of purpose underlying this objection is a platitude providing no useful
guidance in difficult cases. This is apparent, for example, in that compelling testimony might
increase the efficiency of the criminal process. See, e.g., McKay, Sef-Incriminalion and the New
Pn'ay, 1967 S. CT. REv. 193, 208. An adequate statement of rationale must provide insight
as to why values such as efficiency occupy a subordinate place when considering one individ-
ual's right to silence.
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a purpose of the amendment. However, an adequate statement of ra-
tionale should provide direction as to the circumstances in which the
witness is entitled to the privilege. Surely the privilege is available at a
criminal defendant's own trial. The words of the fifth amendment say
that much. What they do not tell is how to get from "in any criminal
case" to legislative, administrative, or other civil cases.82 This broaden-
ing of the amendment's scope is attained only by recourse to the reasons
behind the amendment. The pertinent inquiry, then, is whether the
concerns guaranteeing the privilege in the paradigmatic case of defend-
ant's assertion at trial also guarantee the privilege in other contexts
where prosecution appears remote.
In addition to raising the above objections, the federal judiciary has
nearly unanimously relied on HoJinan v. United States. As the next sec-
tion of this comment demonstrates, Hoftinan is an inappropriate source
of authority. Briefly stated, Hofjman provides little guidance for deter-
mining the constitutional status of prosecution likelihoods because it ad-
dressed a different problem-the practical problem of ascertaining from
the witness whether there are endangering facts without destroying the
privilege. Assessing prosecution likelihoods does not necessarily entail
this latter dilemma because the relevant variables may be analyzed
largely without answers from the witness.
UNITED STATES V MASON AND THE REAL DANGER DOCTRINE
Central to understanding the federal judiciary's misapplication of
Hofnan is a recognition of Hofrnan's acceptance of United States v. Ma-
son.83 Hoftnan held that compelling testimony is impermissible unless it
is " 'perfectly clear' " that the evidence " 'cannot possibly'" tend to incrimi-
nate the witness.84 Hoffran cited Mason for its facially stricter proposi-
tion that the fifth amendment "protection must be confined to instances
where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a di-
rect answer."'8 5 The two strands of Hoffman are not inconsistent. The
second speaks to a set of circumstances which are sufficiently dangerous
to warrant application of the privilege. Mason described the presence of
these circumstances as real danger.86 The first describes the burden of
proving these circumstances. In rejecting the likelihood of prosecution
82 U.S. CONST. amend. V. See note 1 supra.
83 244 U.S. 362.
84 341 U.S. at 488 (quoting from Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. at 898 (1881) (em-
phasis in original)). See notes 25-27 & accompanying text supra.
85 341 U.S. at 486. See 244 U.S. at 365.
86 244 U.S. at 365 (quoting Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 144 (1913); Brown v.
Walker, 161 U.S. at 599, 600 (1896)).
1981]
COMMENTS
test, federal courts have wrongly employed the proof standard to empty
the phrase "real danger" of its content.
The Mason real danger doctrine sprung from cases rejecting claims
that immunity from prosecution was not an adequate substitute for the
privilege.87 In Regina v. Boes,88 the witness refused to answer questions
after the Solicitor General granted him a pardon under the Great Seal.
The witness contended that, although the pardon would protect him
against every other form of prosecution, it would not protect him
against parliamentary impeachment. 89 He further contended that the
bare possibility of legal peril was sufficient to entitle him to protection.
The court responded with language quoted in Mason:
Further than this, we are of opinion that the danger to be apprehended
must be real and appreciable, with reference to the ordinary operation of
law in the ordinary course of things-not a danger of an imaginary and
unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and
barely possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would
suffer it to influence his conduct.90
Premising its decision solely on the unlikelihood of parliamentary im-
peachment, the court indicated a willingness to consider prosecution
likelihood.
The Supreme Court initially approved the English approach in
87 See Wolfram, Peril, Pursuit and the Privilege Against Sef-Incrimination." The Problem of the
Apparenty Innocuous Question, 5 SYRACUSE L. REv. 127, 131 n. 18 (1954).
88 [1861] 1 B.&S. 311.
89 Id at 319, 320. "An impeachment is a criminal proceeding by the House of Commons
against any person." 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAWs 379 (3d ed. 1922).
The House of Lords passes judgment in accordance with the vote of its majority and, on the
demand of the House of Commons, it passes sentence. Id at 379-80. The proceeding was
reserved primarily "for great men and great causes." Id at 379. It was devised to prevent
ministers of the crown from breaking the law and to ensure the supremacy of the law over all.
Id at 380, 382. The first instance of impeachment was in 1376 and the last in 1805 in the
case of Lord Melville. Impeachment fell into disuse because it was awkward and dilatory, but
it is, and was at the time of the Boys case, still legally possible. Id at 380, 385.
The King by royal pardon was unable to prevent impeachment. "A pardon could be
pleaded to an indictment; but an indictment was a proceeding taken in the king's name. An
impeachment was a proceeding taken in the name of the Commons; and he could no more
stop it by granting a pardon than he could stop a criminal appeal brought by a private
person." Id at 383 (citation omitted).
90 1 B.&S. at 330, quoted in 244 U.S. at 365-66. The Court went on to state:
We think that a merely remote and naked possibility, out of the ordinary course of the
law and such as no reasonable man would be affected by, should not be suffered to
obstruct the administration ofjustice. The object of the law is to afford to a party, called
upon to give evidence in a proceeding inter alios, protection against being brought by
means of his own evidence within the penalties of the law. But it would be to convert a
salutary protection into a means of abuse if it were to be held that a mere imaginary
possibility of danger, however remote and improbable, was sufficient to justify withhold-
ing of evidence essential to the ends of justice.
I B.&S. at 330-31, quoted in 244 U.S. at 366.
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Brown v. Walker,9' also cited in Mason. In that case, the witness argued
that a federal immunity grant could not supplant the privilege because
the immunity would not extend to state prosecutions. The Court held
that the statute involved did protect against state prosecution, and thus
prosecution likelihood did not directly affect the decision as it had in
Boyes. Nevertheless, the Court noted in dicta that "even granting that
there were [sic] still a bare possibility that by his disclosure he might be
subjected to the criminal laws of some other sovereignty, that, as Chief
Justice Cockburn said in the Queen v. Boyes . . . is not a real and proba-
ble danger."
'92
Adopting the so-called dual sovereignty rule in the early 1930s, the
Court went further than Brown in order to resolve a conflicting line of
decisions by holding that the federal privilege did not in any event ex-
tend to testimony incriminating under state law.93 When the Court re-
versed itself in Murphy v. Waterront Comm'n of New York Harbor,94 holding
that the privilege extends to testimony in one jurisdiction, state or fed-
eral, which might be incriminating under the laws of the other, the
Court left open the materiality of prosecution likelihoods. 95
91 161 U.S. 591.
92 Id at 609 (citation omitted). The Court urged a practical construction of the fifth
amendment:
It can only be said in general that the clause should be construed, as it was doubtless
designed, to effect a practical and beneficent purpose-not necessarily to protect wit-
nesses against every possible detriment which might happen to them from their testi-
mony, nor to unduly impede, hinder or obstruct the administration of criminal justice.
Id at 596. Cf Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372, 380-82 (1905) (case held that under the four-
teenth amendment a witness could not refuse to testify in a state proceeding where there is no
real danger of federal prosecution).
93 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 149 (1931). Compare United States v. Saline
Bank of Virginia, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 100, 102, 104 (1828), and Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186,
195-96 (1906), with Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 68-69 (1906).
94 378 U.S. 52.
95 Prior to Murdock, a number of federal and state courts followed the Boes and Brown
approach to interjurisdictional possibility of prosecution in interpreting the scope of both
federal and state privilege provisions. See, e.g., In re Graham, 10 F. Cas. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1876)
(No. 5,659); In re Hess, 134 F. 109 (E.D. Pa. 1905) (discussed in Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n of New YorkHarbor, 378 U.S. at 63 n.8). These cases and the majority of federal
courts considering the question, however, ruled in favor of conferring the privilege on the
witness. One explanation for this pattern is that "the danger of prosecution . . . has been
considered to be impending rather than remote." Annot., 82 A.L.R. 1380, 1382 (1933). A
number of state cases, however, adopted the Brown approach against granting the privilege.
See, e.g., People ex rel Akin v. Butler St. Foundry & Iron Co., 201 Ill. 236, 66 N.E. 349 (1903);
Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 N.Y. 244, 177 N.E. 489 (1931). See also Grant, Federalism and Se/f-
Incrimination, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 549, 554-63 (1957); McNaughton, Se#f-Incrnination Under
Foreign law, 45 VA. L. REV. 1299, 1301-07 (1959); Annot., 154 A.L.R. 994 (1945); Annot., 59
A.L.R. 895 (1929). Brown and the cases cited above considered likelihoods of foreign prosecu-
tion relevant to forum privilege grants. The interjurisdictional context would not appear to
diminish the authority of these cases unless the standard was purely cross-jurisdictional, con-
comitant with recognition of, or at least confusion with respect to, dual sovereignty. This was
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Hofman left the Mason real danger doctrine intact, and the doctrine
continues to receive confirmation in Supreme Court decisions.9 6 Ho#-
man s contribution was a more liberal approach to real danger proof
requirements. Nonetheless, the Court's citation of Mason, with the lat-
ter's explicit approval of Boyes and Brown, was initially the subject of
some unfounded consternation among lower courts which failed to ap-
preciate both aspects of Hoffman.
9 7
Had the defendants in Mason answered the questions affirmatively,
they would have admitted one of three elements necessary for convic-
tion: a game of cards, money stakes, and participation in the game.98
Given this setting, a post-Hofiman court unquestionably would have re-
versed the contempt citations upheld in Mason. Nevertheless, the con-
tradiction between Mason and Hofnan is only apparent. In requiring
the judge to give greater deference to the witness' determination that an
answer would be incriminating, Hoffman reduced the level of proof re-
quired to establish real danger. For both the Hof-nan and Mason Courts,
however, the metaphysical quantum of real danger sufficient for a valid
invocation of the privilege was identical.
Hofman departed from the stricter proof requirements of previous
caselaw in recognition of what might be termed a fifth amendment di-
not necessarily the case. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rhine, 303 S.W.2d 301,304 (1957) (priv-
ilege to be allowed "whenever there is a probability of prosecution in either State or Federal
jurisdictions").
96 See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976) (citing Mason's discussion of real
danger, the Court states that "the older witness cases reflect an appropriate accommodation
of the Fifth Amendment privilege and the generally applicable principle that governments
have a right to everyone's testimony."); Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Comm'n, 406
U.S. at 478 (1972). In Zicare/li, the witness refused to answer questions on the grounds he
feared foreign prosecution. He introduced newspaper and magazine articles condemning him
as an international criminal figure. Upholding a contempt order, the Court stated that the
one hundred questions were designed to elicit information solely related to activities in the
United States and that "appellant was never in real danger of being compelled to disclose
information that might incriminate him under foreign law." Id at 480. Citing Mason, Brown,
and Boyes, the Court stated that "[i]t is well established that the privilege protects against real
dangers, not remote and speculative possibilities." Id at 478 & n.12. See also Marchetti v.
United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. at 100 (White, J., concurring).
97 In discussing United States v. Greenberg, 192 F.2d 201 (discussed in note 28 supra), the
Third Circuit stated:
We regarded this case [Mason] as particularly striking, even extreme, in its insistence
upon an affirmative showing that an answer innocent on its face had sinister implica-
tions; for the normal connotation of a card game in a frontier saloon is not that of a game
of Old Maid on a supervised public playground. Moreover, we felt duty bound to regard
the Mason case as a significant precedent because the Hoffman opinion had cited Ma-
son, apparently with approval.
For these reasons we thought our Greenberg decision was correct and consistent
with what the Supreme Court had intended in the Hoffman opinion.
United States v. Coffey, 198 F.2d at 440.
98 See notes 17-20 & accompanying text supra for a discussion of Mason.
[Vol. 72
SELF-INCRIMINA TION
lemma. In United States v. Weisman ,99 Learned Hand phrased the prob-
lem in this way: "Logically, indeed, he [the witness] is boxed in a
paradox, for he must prove the criminatory character of what it is his
privilege to suppress just because it is criminatory."' 1° The only worka-
ble solution, according to Hand, "is to be content with the door's being
set a little ajar, and while at times this no doubt destroys the privilege,
and at times it permits the suppression of competent evidence, nothing
better is available."' 01
Shortly after Weisman, United States v. St. Pierre10 2 illustrated the
dangers lurking in the Hand solution. St. Pierre disclosed before a fed-
eral grand jury that a bookmaker had entrusted to him a sum of money
due on a bet placed by a businessman and admitted keeping the money
for himself. After his refusal to reveal the businessman's name, however,
the district court held him in contempt. Despite counsel's statement
that St. Pierre had transported the money from New York to Canada,
potentially in violation of the National Stolen Property Act, 10 3 the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed, stating, "We must be apprised, in some more de-
pendable manner than a mere statement of counsel, how the answer will
incriminate the witness before we can allow the suppression of the
truth."' 1 4 When called again to testify, St. Pierre once more refused to
reveal the name of the businessman, but, in order to secure the privilege,
he disclosed that he had transported the money to Canada. Affirming
another district court contempt order, the Second Circuit held that by
the additional disclosure St. Pierre had waived the privilege.'0 5
Ho man addressed the St. Pierre conundrum by liberalizing the real
danger proof requirements. The Court began with the Mason proposi-
tion that a witness may invoke the privilege only where he "has reason-
able cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer."106  Facts
sufficing for reasonable cause, however, are presumed to include addi-
tional incriminating facts known only to the" claimant. Correspond-
ingly, the level of apprehension is presumed to be greater than that
99 111 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1940).
100 Id at 262.
101 Id See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 40 (discussed in text accompanying notes 15-
16 supra), wherein Justice Marshall states that when a direct answer might implicate the
witness in a crime, the court must refrain from participating in the decision of what the
witness is to answer "because they cannot decide on the effect of his answer without knowing
what it would be; and a disclosure of that fact to the judges would strip him of the privilege
which the law allows."
102 128 F.2d 979.
103 Pub. L. No. 246, 48 Stat. 794 § 3 (1934).
104 128 F.2d at 981.
105 132 F.2d 837. See Wolfram, supra note 87, at 134-36 (demonstrating development of
Hoffnan in context of disclosure problem).
106 341 U.S. at 486 (citing Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. at 365).
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which could be aroused solely by the facts made apparent to the judge
in order to be granted the privilege. These conclusions flow ineluctably
from the Court's statement of its rationale.
[I]f the witness upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the haz-
ard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in
court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the
privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege it need only be
evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is
asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it
cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could
result. 107
The Hoffinan Court fashioned a liberal standard that placed the
burden on the defendant to show only a possibility of incrimination
before invoking the privilege.' 0 8 In rejecting the likelihood of prosecu-
tion test, the appellate courts have erroneously adapted to the question
of prosecution probability a standard that evolved as a compromise be-
tween tensions inhering in the analytically distinct problem of incrimi-
nation probability. The point is that these tensions are nonexistent in
the process of evaluating the possibility of prosecution.
Arguably, cases addressing the incriminating quality of the evi-
dence1 0 9 determine the existence of real danger effectively according to a
"disclosure-plus" factor: the testimony itself plus the nondisclosed infor-
mation necessarily assumed incriminating due to the dilemma noted by
Learned Hand. Both the disclosed and at least part of the nondisclosed
information are necessary to give rise to apprehension of danger suffi-
cient for fifth amendment purposes. In this scheme, the importance of
Hoif nan is its organic alteration of the disclosure-plus factor. Informa-
tion previously required to be disclosed now need not be. The total
amount of disclosure-plus necessary for real danger purposes has re-
mained theoretically constant.
The practical implications of this abstraction have been difficult to
appreciate because in the majority of cases resolution of the privilege
issue hinges on proof of crimination, which in turn may entail establish-
ing facts less than those constituting real danger. Assessing the
probability of prosecution, however, does not entail consideration of a
nondisclosed component. The determination is based on objective pub-
lic factors, including the testimony, other evidence, and the factors rele-
vant to the choice of a prosecutor's office to exercise its discretion."10
Forgetting the peculiar circumstances which Hoffnan addressed, federal
107 Id at 486-87.
108 Id at 488. See notes 25-30 & accompanying text supra.
109 See, e.g., cases cited in notes 28, 32, 39 & 96 supra.
110 See note 42 supra.
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circuit courts addressing the constitutional relevance of prosecution like-
lihoods have assumed that facts constituting a Hotan minimum show-
ing would by themselves produce sufficient fifth amendment
apprehension. This faulty assumption easily leads courts to the conclu-
sion that "[w]hen a witness can demonstrate any possibility of prosecu-
tion which is more than fanciful he has demonstrated a reasonable fear
of prosecution." ' '
Hoffnan and its progeny are not controlling on the acceptability of
the likelihood of prosecution test. The lack of guidance provided by
Hoffnan v. UnitedStates underscores the need to evaluate the test in light
of the rationale for the privilege.
THE BURGER COURT AND THE BALANCE BETWEEN STATE AND
INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS
Courts and commentators have adduced a multitude of rationales
for the privilege. The catalogue offered in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of
New York Harbor illustrates this diversity:
[The privilege] reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble
aspirations; our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the
cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for
an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our
fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treat-
ment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates 'a fair state-individ-
ual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone
until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the govern-
ment in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load;'. . . our
respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of
each individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a private life'...
our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the
privilege, while sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty' is often 'a protection to
the innocent."'
2
Commentators have consolidated these normative considerations
into three which are fundamental:" 3 privacy," 4 the moral dignity and
I11 In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 609 F.2d at 871.
112 378 U.S. at 55 (footnotes omitted).
113 Dann, The Fifth Amendment Pn'vlege Against SelCIncrminationt Extorting Physical Evidence
from a Suspect, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 597 (1970); Fortas, The FiAth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere
Seipsum, 25 CLEv. B.A.J. 95 (1954); Friendly, supra note 45; Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd" Self-
Incrimination and Private Papers in the Burger Court, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 343 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Demise of Boyd]; Gerstein, Ptvacj and SelfIncrimination, 80 ETHICS 87 (1970) [hereinaf-
ter cited asfhivaq ]; McKay, supra note 81; McNaughton, The Phivilege Against Seif-Incri ination.:
Its ConstitutionalAfectation, Raison d'Etre and Miscellaneous Implications, 51 J. CRIM. L. & C. 138
(1960); O'BRIEN, supra note 13.
114 See, e.g., Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966), where the court
stated that "the federal privilege against self-incrimination reflects the Constitution's concern
for the essential values represented by 'our respect for the inviolability of human personality
19811
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humanity of the individual, 1 5 and a fair balance between the state and
the individual. 16 The prevailing value will have far-reaching impact
on the applicability of the privilege and, of immediate concern, on the
constitutional validity of the likelihood of prosecution test.
Privacy taken as an end in itself might allow invocation of the priv-
ilege even where there is immunity from prosecution. 117 Under the ra-
tionale which seeks to preserve the moral dignity of the individual, the
same result might follow on the theory that confession is hard on the
individual, even if there is no threat of prosecution.1 18 On the other
hand, where the privilege is viewed not as valuable in itself, but as in-
strumental to preserving the balance between the individual and the
state maintaining the accusatory system, the privilege probably would
not be available absent any danger of prosecution."19
The Burger Court has adopted this instrumentalist mode of analy-
sis. Under this view, approximating that of Bentham, even where there
is a danger of prosecution, "the scope of the fifth amendment will vary
and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life"
... '" See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. at 55; United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698
(1944); Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 489-90 (1944); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
A number of commentators have urged that the privacy rationale lacks historic founda-
tion. See, e.g. , O'Connor, The Right to tivacy in Historical Perspective, 53 MASs. L.Q. 101 (1968).
In defense Judge Jerome Frank urged that these critics, "in their over-emphasis on the history
of the Fifth Amendment, overlook the fact that a noble principle often transcends its origins.
Creative misunderstandings account for some of our most cherished values and institutions."
United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d at 581.
115 Bentham referred to this rationale as the "Old woman's reason." "The essence of this
reason is contained in the word hard: 'tis hard upon a man to be obliged to criminate him-
self.' " 5 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 230 (1827). To be avoided are
torture, browbeating, bullying, and the trilemma of harmful disclosure, contempt, and per-
jury. Where the witness discloses the information sought, "[t]he witness' 'will' will have been
broken. Or, put another way, that the witness will have been forced to do a 'stultifying'
thing." McNaughton, supra note 113, at 147. Where the witness perjures himself he commits
a crime against God or violates a commitment to truthtelling as a guiding moral principle.
Id. at 148. In any case, the witness must commit the "'unnatural act' of inficling injury on
hirnsef." Id. (emphasis in original).
116 According to Bentham, this reason-the "fox hunter's"-
consists in introducing upon the carpet of legal procedure the ideal of fairness, in the
sense in which the word is used by sportsmen. The fox is to have a fair chance for his life:
he must have (so close is the analogy) what is called law: leave to run a certain length of
way, for the express purpose of giving him a chance for escape.
5 J. BErrHAM, supra note 115, at 238-39 (emphasis in original). This rationale emphasizes
preservation of the accusatorial system in which the government "must establish guilt by
evidence independently and freely secured and not by coercion to prove its charge against the
accused out of his own mouth." Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1960).
117 See Privacy, supra note 113, at 88; McKay, supra note 81, at 212; O'Brien, supra note 113,
at 48.
118 See O'Brien, supra note 13, at 44.
119 See id at 39; JWvaq, supra note 113, at 88.
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with judicial evaluation of the degree of personal compulsion and the
utility of the privilege relative to the maintenance of a fair state-individ-
ual balance."' 120 According to the Burger Court, "the fundamental pur-
pose of the Fifth Amendment [is] the preservation of an adversary
system of criminal justice."'121 Under this rationale, Professor O'Brien
notes that "the fifth amendment confers only a privilege and not a right
against self-accusation. That is, the amendment may be extended or
contracted depending upon judicial evaluations of its utility in different
circumstances for maintaining an accusatorial system."' 22 Thus, as the
Court molds its notion of a fair balance between state and individual
interests, it concomitantly redefines "compulsion" and the context in
which a claim may be made. This approach has uniformly resulted in
narrowing the scope of protection.
123
The Court's decisions in the area of reporting and registration re-
quirements dramatically manifest this restrictive approach. These cases
demonstrate the vitality of the real danger doctrine and provide support
for the likelihood of prosecution test. In Califomia v. Byers,124 the defend-
ant was convicted under a statute requiring motorists in accidents to
stop and identify themselves. The Warren Court had previously struck
down a statute requiring registration by individual members of the
Communist Party in Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.125 and in
Marchetti v. United States 12 6 did likewise with a statute requiring monthly
statements by gamblers concerning their wagering activities. In both of
those cases the questions were directed toward a "highly selective group
inherently suspect of criminal activities."' 27 Upholding the hit-and-run
statute, the Byers plurality stated that "[t]he disclosure of inherently ille-
gal activity is inherently risky. . . . But disclosures with respect to au-
tomobile accidents simply do not entail the kind of substantial risk of
120 O'Brien, supra note 13, at 40.
121 Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976).
122 O'Brien, supra note 13, at 40 (footnote omitted).
123 The Burger Court has restricted the scope of the privilege in both pretrial and trial
contexts. See United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980); Garner v. United States, 424
U.S. 648; Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973);
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441; Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
The Burger Court has sharply curbed the reach of AMiranda. See, e.g., United States v.
Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977); United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977); Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976); Beckwith
v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976). See generally O'Brien, supra note 13, at 54-70.
124 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
125 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
126 390 U.S. 39. See also Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Haynes v. United
States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
127 382 U.S. at 79.
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self-incrimination involved in . . . [serious criminal cases]. Further-
more, the statutory purpose is noncriminal and self-reporting is indis-
pensable to its fulfillment." 128 Unlike Marchetti and Albertson, the
requirements were not established in an area "permeated with criminal
statutes."1
29
Under Hoftinan, the Bers reporting requirement clearly would haz-
ard compelling the witness to provide a link in the chain of evidence
leading to a prosecution.130 Determinative for the Court was the pur-
pose of the requirement, which was not prosecutorial and was both legit-
imate and important. 131 The Court again stressed the importance of
prosecutorial motivation in Gamer v. United States 132 where the defendant
was indicted for conspiracy to fix sports events and transmit bets after
reporting his occupation as a professional gambler on his federal income
tax return. Holding that failure to assert the privilege at the time of
filling out the tax return precluded any claim of compulsion, the Court
distinguished the statutes in Marchetti and A/benson as directed at per-
sons inherently suspect of criminal activities. Thus the Court declined
to adopt a "similar presumption that a taxpayer makes disclosures on
his return rather than claims the privilege because his will is over-
borne."1
33
Together Byers and Gamer establish that, absent prosecutorial moti-
vation, compelled disclosure does not disturb the balance embodied in
an accusatorial system. The likelihood of prosecution test is consistent
with these cases. Although an important factor in Gamer was the wit-
ness' failure to claim the privilege, the witness who claims the privilege,
and then is denied it under the likelihood of prosecution test, sits in the
advantageous position of having the absence of prosecutorial purpose
affirmatively determined specifically for that case. Most indicative,
however, of the test's consistency with current Supreme Court doctrine
is the increased personal risk which the witness must show when the
government is pursuing nonprosecutorial purposes. The Court in Byers
and Garner apparently considered the presence or absence of
prosecutorial motive as bearing on the criminating nature of the disclo-
sure rather than on the likelihood of prosecution. In other words, the
more permeated the regulatory scheme was with criminal laws, the more
likely that a disclosure would be criminating. 134 By manipulating the
128 402 U.S. at 431. See note 115 supra.
129 382 U.S. at 79.
130 402 U.S. at 439 (Harlan, J., concurring); The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 38, 269 (1971).
131 402 U.S. at 431.
132 424 U.S. 648.
133 Id at 657-58.
134 402 U.S. at 428, 430. See note 9 supra.
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Hoftnan standard in Byers and the term "compulsion" in Gamer, the
Court made incriminating information more accessible to the govern-
ment and increased the chances of such information being used against
the witness.
The Court's restriction of real danger proof requirements in favor
of important governmental interests suggests that it may be willing to
demand more than a speculative possibility of prosecution in favor of
the efficient administration of discovery.'
35
Although the Court's construction of the balance between state and
individual interests is not inconsistent with the likelihood of prosecution
test, the construction is misconceived. This construction leads, in Justice
Harlan's words, to "a collection of artificial, if not disingenuous judg-
ments that the risks of incrimination are not there when they really are
there."' 3 6 The amendment does more than ensure a fair fight and
proper balance between the individual and state; rather it is a defini-
tional component of a fair balance embodying a respect for privacy and
the dignity of the individual.
THE LIKELIHOOD OF PROSECUTION TEST RECONSIDERED
The history and intellectual foundations of the privilege support
this more principled approach. Both Fortas and McNaughton link ex-
tinction of authority to require self-incriminatory statements with the
seventeenth century revolution in political thought. 137 Hobbes, and
later Locke, viewed human behavior mechanistically as a product of the
passions. The most powerful passions, the desire for comfortable living
and fear of death, reinforce the individual's right to self-preservation.
"All the laws of nature and all social and political duties are derived
from and subordinate to the individual's right to self-preservation."'
' 38
Locke departed from Hobbes in his solution to the state of nature:
135 Although perhaps balancing sub silentio, the Byers Court explicitly premised its holding
on an absence of real danger. 402 U.S. at 431. See notes 128-31 & accompanying text supra.
Supporting a balancing test in dictum, however, the plurality stated baldly that "under our
holdings the mere possibility of incrimination is insufficient to defeat the strong policies in
favor of a disclosure called for by statutes like the one challenged here." Id. at 428. Justice
Harlan also supported a balancing test, making a majority of the Court. Id. at 452-55.
If the Court held that prosecution likelihoods are immaterial to fifth amendment inter-
ests, a claimant might prevail in any subsequent balancing. Generally, the government is
likely to prevail when there is a strong state interest of the type embodied in a regulatory
statute, and when allowing the privilege would completely destroy that interest. See, e.g., id
at 451; Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648; United States v. Carlson, 617 F.2d 521 (9th
Cir. 1980). The potential impact of the likelihood of prosecution test on the effective adminis-
tration of the courts may not amount to a strong interest. But see In re Folding Carton Anti-
trust Litigation, 465 F. Supp. at 624 n.4, 625 (discussed in notes 48-60 & accompanying text
supra).
136 California v. Byers, 402 U.S. at 442 (Harlan, J., concurring).
137 Fortas, supra note 113, at 98; McNaughton, supra note 113, at 149.
138 L. STRAuss & J. CRoPsEY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 359 (1963).
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a democracy with supreme power in the people rather than the all-
mighty Leviathan. Submitting to arbitrary rule, according to Locke,
contradicted the basic premise that action tends to self-preservation, for
this form of government would put man "into a worse condition than
the state of nature."1 39 Both philosophers agreed, however, that individ-
uals have a social contract with each other to secure their own preserva-
tion, and no one can be pressured to contract away rights that would
defeat that purpose. Thus, certain rights remain incapable of being as-
signed through contract. 140 Among those rights, Hobbes notes explic-
itly, is the right against self-incrimination.
14 1
The history of the amendment likewise supports the conclusion that
it is more than a policeman of an accusatorial courtroom. In his Pulit-
zer Prize-winning history of the fifth amendment, Leonard Levy
142
traces its origins to the use of the oath ex oftio by the English High
Commission and Star Chamber in England. The oath was a sworn
statement by the accused to give true answers to any question. The de-
fendant was required to swear without knowing the charge, the identity
of the accuser, or the nature of the evidence. 143 The English common
law courts, procedurally accusatorial, for the most part remained free of
the oath. 144 On the other hand, following the inquisitorial model of the
Roman canon law, the English ecclesiastical courts, whose supreme
body was the High Commission, adopted the oath as early as 1236.145
The Star Chamber, the judicial arm of the King's council, in turn fol-
lowed the example of the High Commission.1
46
The High Commission and Star Chamber used the oath first
139 j. LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT § 137 (1821).
140 L. STRAUSS & J. CRoPsEY, supra note 138, at 359-60, 366, 454.
141 "If a man be interrogated by the Soveraign, or his Authority, concerning a crime done
by himselfe, he is not bound (without assurance of Pardon) to confesse it; because no man (as
I have shewn in the same Chapter) can be obliged by Covenant to accuse himselfe." T.
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 21, at 167 (Oxford ed. 1909).
142 L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1971).
143 Id at 46-47.
44 [ he principal incursion made by the inquisitional system on the common law...
was the preliminary examination of accused persons ...
By the close of the sixteenth century these examinations were becoming quite in-
quisitorial. . . . Torture, however,. . . was never used in any common law proceeding.
Nevertheless, the preliminary examination by the justice of the peace was a common-law
equivalent of the secret inquisition used on the Continent.
Id at 35.
145 Criminal jurisdiction of the ecclesiastic courts reached three categories of offenses: sins
of the flesh, offenses against religion, and a miscellany of crimes including usury, defamation,
drunkeness, and disorderly conduct. Id at 44.
146 Initially the Council exercised executive, legislative, and judicial functions. Judicial
offshoots of the Council became central common law courts. By the middle of the thirteenth
century, the remaining judicial functions were taken up by the Council's prerogative court,




against the protestants, then against the Catholics during Elizabeth I's
reign, and later against the Puritans. Recounting the challenges to the
oath lying at the root of the privilege, Levy unequivocally demonstrates
that the right emerged because it was considered intrinsically valuable,
rather than simply protective of the accusatory system. The writings of
William Tyndale, which later influenced the Puritan challenges to the
High Commission, provided an early example of opposition to the oath
as an invasion of the hearts and consciences of men. 147 Tyndale's trans-
lation of the New Testament rendered into English for the first time
these words of Christ: "agayne ye have herde, howe it was said to them
of old tyme, thous shalt not forswere thysilfe, but shalt perform thine
othe to god."' 48 Tyndale himself wrote that it was "a cruel thing to
break up into a man's heart, and to compel him to put either soul or
body in jeopardy, or to shame himself." 149 As Robert Gerstein pointed
out, "[t]he central point was that an individual ought to be autonomous
in his efforts to come to terms in his own conscience with accusations of
wrongdoing against him."1 50 For legal authority, defendants before the
Star Chamber and High Commission would look to the Magna Carta as
the source of liberty of the subject. Levy states that "[o]n these two,
Magna Carta and conscience, was founded what would become the
right against self-incrimination." 151
The argument based on conscience was combined with an invoca-
tion of the law of nature in the 1580 case involving the Catholic defend-
ants William Lord Vaux and Sir Thomas Tresham, accused of
harboring a Jesuit awaiting trial for religious crimes.152 Asked to take
the oath, Tresham replied "[a]nd, if I dyd accuse myselfe by my owne
othe, I should condemne myselfe, against the lawe of nature and Gods
lawe." 53 Levy wrote, "The argument based on conscience would have
tremendous force in bringing about the abolition of the oath ex oftYio.
But it was Tresham's invocation of the 'law of nature sepsum prodere'
which had immediately telling effect."' 54 Similarly, before the King's
Bench in 1607, Nicholas Fuller relied on Aristotle's notion of self-preser-
vation in arguing that the oath violated the law of nature in leading to
147 e W. TYNDALE, THE OBEDIENCE OF A CHRISTEN MAN, AND HOW CHRISTEN RUL-
ERS OUGHT TO GOVERN (1528), repi'zntedin H. WALTER, DOCTRINAL TREATISES AND INTRO-
DUCTIONS TO DIFFERENT PORTIONS OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES. By WILLIAM TYNDALE
(1848).
148 L. LEvy, supra note 142, at 63 (quoting ARBER, FIRST PRINTED ENGLISH NEW TESTA-
MENT 25 (facsimile text)).
'49 Id at 63-64 (quoting W. TYNDALE, supra note 147, at 187, 203, 335).
150 Demire ofBqpd, supra note 113, at 347 (citations omitted).
151 L. LEVY, supra note 142, at 178. Se id at 165, 178, 180, 196, 214, 246-47.
152 Id at 100-07.
153 Id at 104.
154 Ma at 105.
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self-destruction. 55 Levy concludes his chapter on Fuller and Coke with
the observation that, although arguments from religion, conscience, and
considerations of procedural fair play were critical in the development
of the privilege, "more and more people were beginning to think that to
coerce a man to testify against himself, with or without oath, was simply
unjust-an outrage on human dignity and a violation of the very instict
of self-preservation." 15
6
Accepting that at the root of the privilege is a concept of govern-
ment whose power is limited by the compact creating it, Fortas states:
The principle that a man is not obliged to furnish the state with ammuni-
tion to use against him is basic to this conception. Equals, meeting in bat-
tle, owe no such duty to one another, regardless of the obligations that they
may be under prior to battle. A sovereign state has the right to defend
itself, and within the limits of accepted procedure, to punish infractions of
the rules that govern its relationships with its sovereign individuals. But it
has no right to compel the sovereign individual to surrender or impair his
right of self-defense.1
57
Contrary to the suggestion of one commentator, the privilege thus con-
ceived does not serve merely instrumentally "as a policy objective of
accusatorial systems;"'158 rather, it limits the power of the state in its
155 Id at 235.
156 Id at 263. The privilege obtained general currency in the aftermath of Lilburne's trial
before the Star Chamber in 1637. In addition to invoking the arguments based on con-
science, the law of nature, and the "law of the land," see id at 277, 305, Lilburne sought to
educate the public on the relation of liberty to fair play in criminal procedure. Id at 302,
313. The right as secured after Lilburne's trial "did not prohibit inquiry nor even incriminat-
ing interrogations, but it did permit a refusal to answer without formal prejudice or penalty."
L. LEVY, supra note 142, at 313.
The privilege first appeared in America in Liberty 45 of the Massachusetts Body of Lib-
erties, which, although intended to abolish torture, did not recognize the privilege at public
trials and left unanswered the discretion of the magistrate to extract confessions in capital
cases. By 1667, however, the Grand Assembly of Virginia, the state's supreme judicial body
and legislature, declared that "[t]he law has provided that a witness summoned against an-
other ought to answer upon oath, but no law can compel a man to sweare against himself in
any matter wherein he is lyable to corporal punishment." Id at 358.
The scope of the right as it existed in both America and the colonies during the eight-
eenth century was narrower than today. The right was against compulsog, self-incrimination,
and almost always had to be claimed by the defendant. The suspect's incriminating state-
ments at preliminary examinations or arraignment could be used against him at trial. Nor
were the authorities under any obligation to warn the defendant of his rights. Id at 406.
Nevertheless, the application of the right was expansive. The right applied to witnesses and
parties at all stages of all equity and common law proceedings. Grand jury witnesses could
invoke the privilege as could parties and witnesses in private actions and witnesses before
legislative tribunals. Id Madison's proposed amendment reflects that breadth: "[n]o person
shall be compelled ... to be a witness against himself." Speech, of Madison, Jan. 8, 1789, I
ANNALS OF CONGRESS 434. By the beginning of the eighteenth century in England, and later
that same century in the colonies, the privilege apparently did extend in some instances to
questions tending merely to disgrace the witness. L. LEVY, supra note 142, at 406.
157 Fortas, supra note 113, at 98-99.
158 O'Brien, supra note 13, at 37.
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relationship with the individual. The principles governing the relation-
ship between man and state, which are derived from the individual's
right to self-preservation, assure a fair fight. One of these principles is
the privilege against self-incrimination.
In his dissenting opinion in United States v. Wade, 159 Justice Fortas
underscored the intrinsic value of the privilege and offered a model for
its application. Fortas agreed with the majority that exhibiting the ac-
cused in a lineup is incidental to the state's power to arrest, and there-
fore not violative of the privilege. He disagreed, however, with the
majority's conclusion that the state could compel the accused to speak
the words uttered by the person who committed the crime. Whereas the
former "does not require that the accused take affirmative, volitional
action," the latter "is more than passive, mute assistance to the eyes of
the victim or of witnesses. It is the kind of volitional act-the kind of
forced cooperation by the accused--which is within the historic perime-
ter of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination."' 60 Following
Fortas, Dann argues for the availability of the privilege "[w]henever an
accused has it within his power to alter the evidence so as to affect its
probative value on the issues of guilt or innocence."1 61 When the ac-
cused does have control over the evidence, "the prohibited psychological
trilemma"' 62 between harmful disclosure, contempt, and perjury is pres-
ent.
The validity of the likelihood of prosecution test under the ap-
proach of Fortas and Dann, however, cannot rest solely on the concept
of volition. The matter is not one of determining the testimonial nature
of evidence, but rather whether evidence over which the witness does
have control is extracted in the arena of conflict between the state and
the individual. The battle-to use Fortas' term 16--begins when the in-
dividual commits an act which the state punishes as criminal, and cer-
tainly at the time the act is brought to the attention of the prosecuting
attorney. The variables which make prosecution likely or unlikely are
for the government to revel or despair in, but for the individual to give
his opponent added artillery just because victory appears assured would
be irrational and flatly contradicts an understanding of the privilege as
protecting the individual's right to refrain from volitional acts of self-
destruction. Thus, witnesses in either criminal or civil proceedings
should not be compelled to testify where there is a possibility of criminal
liability, irrespective of the likelihood of prosecution.
159 388 U.S. at 259 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
16o Ma at 260.
161 Dann, sufira note 113, at 612.
162 Id at 630.
163 Fortas, supra note 113, at 98. See note 157 & accompanying text supra.
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Under this concept of balance between the state and the individual,
"real danger" would be any danger of prosecution. The rationale thus
articulated demonstrates that the privilege protects against having to
engage in unnatural acts of self-destruction. At what point the individ-
ual feels personally violated depends on his perception of the circum-
stances. Speculation about objective quanta of real danger necessary to
trigger the privilege is thus a meaningless undertaking because, as Jus-
tice Harlan pointed out, real danger must be assessed from the individ-
ual's point of view.'" The practical impossibility of assessing
individuals' perceived risk necessarily precludes a likelihood of prosecu-
tion test. Justice Harlan put the matter succinctly in Bers: "What we
are really talking about, then, is either a standard for risks of self-incrim-
ination which protects all personal judgments which are not patently
frivolous, or a grant of immunity .... ,,165
CONCLUSION
Ascertaining the constitutional validity of the likelihood of prosecu-
tion test in testimonial compulsion cases raises the larger question of the
meaning of "real danger." Real danger is danger of prosecution. Hoff
man and Mason together suggest that real danger is a theoretically deter-
minable quantity comprising some portion of the universe of relevant
circumstances known to the witness and the court. If the witness were
forced to disclose circumstances constituting real danger, however, he
would disclose his guilt and thereby render moot his claim to the privi-
lege. Hoffman resolved this dilemma by reducing the witness' burden of
proof and requiring only a showing of a possibility of incrimination.
If this analysis is correct, prosecution likelihoods are relevant to
privilege determinations. The prosecuting attorney's interest in pursu-
ing the witness is one factor among others constituting the danger of
prosecution. Thus a court conceivably could conclude that even though
a witness satisfied Hoffman by showing a possibility of incrimination, he
is not entitled to the privilege because the improbability of prosecution
demonstrates the absence of real danger. Moreover, the adoption of this
test would not be inconsistent with the Burger Court's policy orientation
toward the privilege. Confronted with the issue, the Court might con-
clude that a mere possibility of prosecution does not lend sufficient in-
quisitorial taint to allow the witness the privilege.
This analysis, however, is at odds with the history and purpose of
the amendment. The error is the focus on the danger of prosecution.
The history and purposes of the amendment demonstrate that although
164 California v. Byers, 402 U.S. at 438 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
165 Id at 442.
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the privilege is concerned with the consequences of disclosure, it is also
concerned with the act of disclosure itself. That a person should commit
an act of self-destruction is unnatural. Under this mode of analysis, real
danger depends on the perceptions of the claimant. The personal na-
ture of the privilege and the difficulty of uncovering the perceptions of
the claimant show that the test is contrary to the fifth amendment.
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